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INTRODUCTION TO RECALLING VICO'S LAMENT: THE ROLE OF
PRUDENCE AND RHETORIC IN LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION
FRANCIS J. MOOTZ III*
This Symposium marks the three-hundredth anniversary of Giambattista Vico's famous address to the University of Naples, On the Study
Methods of Our Time.1 In keeping with the tradition that a professor of
rhetoric deliver the inaugural oration for the new school year, Vico delivered this address (his seventh) in 1708; it was published the following year.
Vico is justly credited with providing in this address one of the most concise and incisive articulations of the peril of wholesale surrender to Cartesian methodologism, although by this time the intellectual die largely had
been cast. Vico readily conceded that the battle of the ancients and modems
was over: the scientific method had proven its superiority in many areas of
knowledge and undeniably was an engine for intellectual and technological
development. Nevertheless, Vico urged scholars not to discard those elements of the classical tradition that fostered wisdom beyond the narrow
confines of technical knowledge. Of greatest significance for this Symposium, Vico argued that the study and practice of law required a cultivation
of the wisdom of the ancients regarding the rhetorical arts, and that it
would be a great mistake to surrender law to the Cartesian method. As
summarized by the translator of the Oration, the "antithesis Vico-Descartes
is, at bottom, the contrast between the mentality of the jurist and that of the
mathematician, between the spirit of erudition, and that fostered by the
'exact' sciences." 2
Vico also challenged the incipient knowledge-based educational
methods that reduced education to a form of behavioral conditioning, arguing that education must be constructive, critical, and active. Combined with
his attention to law, his Oration suggests that legal education must focus on
the cultivation of common sense and prudence, develop the skills of eloquence in deploying this knowledge, ensure that students are engaged actively in this process rather than subjected to the dissemination of
* Samuel Weiss Distinguished Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Penn State Dickinson
School of Law, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The author can be reached at fjmootz@psu.edu.
1. GIAMBATI-ISTA VICO, ON THE STUDY METHODS OF OUR TIME (Elio Gianturco trans., Cornell
Univ. Press 1990) (1709).
2. Elio Ginaturco, Translator'sIntroductionto VICO, supra note 1, at xxviii.
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information, and must not be premised on the employment of the Cartesian
method of ubiquitous doubt in the absence of certainty.
Several selections from Vico's short address provide a flavor of these
themes. In arguing against the growing tendency of universities to honor
the Cartesian method of doubt and to neglect the art of rhetorical reasoning
about matters that admit only of probabilities, Vico writes:
Nature and life are full of incertitude; the foremost, indeed, the only
aim of our "arts" is to assure us that we have acted rightly. Criticism is
the art of true speech; "ars topica," of eloquence. Traditional "topics" is
the art of finding "the medium," i.e., the middle term: in the conventional
language of scholasticism, "medium" indicates what the Latins call argumentum. Those who know all the loci, i.e., the lines of argument to be
used, are able (by an operation not unlike reading the printed characters
on a page) to grasp extemporaneously the elements of persuasion inherent in any question or case. Individuals who have not achieved this ability hardly deserve the name of orators. In pressing, urgent affairs, which
do not admit of delay or postponement, as most frequently occurs in our
law courts-especially when it is a question of criminal cases, which offer to the eloquent orator the greatest opportunity for the display of his
powers-it is the orator's business to give immediate assistance to the
accused, who is usually granted only a few hours in which to plead his
defense. Our experts in philosophical criticism, instead, whenever they
are confronted with some
dubious point, are wont to say: "Give me some
3
time to think it over!"
The difference, therefore, between abstract knowledge and prudence is this: in science, the outstanding intellect is that which succeeds
in reducing a large multitude of physical effects to a single cause; in the
domain of prudence, excellence is accorded to those who ferret out the
greatest possible number of causes which may have produced a single
event,
and who are able to conjecture which of all these causes is the true
4
one.
Vico cleverly shows that inviting the complexities and uncertainties of
rhetorical reasoning is often the only path to decisive action, especially in
law and politics.
The classical account of rhetoric and eloquence did not divorce technique from normative correctness. In this vein, Vico suggests that preserving the art of eloquence will advance ethical understanding because
eloquence is inextricably linked with wisdom. However, by abandoning the
use of eloquence to deal with matters involving uncertainty we have abandoned the ethical landscape in favor of the natural landscape of empirical
facts.
3. VICO, supra note 1, at 15.
4. Id. at 34.
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But the greatest drawback of our educational methods is that we pay
an excessive amount of attention to the natural sciences and not enough
to ethics. Our chief fault is that we disregard that part of ethics which
treats of human character, of its dispositions, its passions, and of the
manner of adjusting these factors to public life and eloquence .... Since,
in our time, the only target of our intellectual endeavors is truth, we devote all our efforts to the investigation of physical phenomena, because
their nature seems unambiguous; but we fail to inquire into human nature
which, because of the freedom of man's will, is difficult to determine. A
serious drawback arises from5 the uncontrasted preponderance of our interest in the natural sciences.
Working from these premises, Vico urged his university audience to
change the educational preparation of future citizens in a manner that takes
advantage of the wisdom of the ancients in dealing with matters of probability.
In conclusion: whosoever intends to devote his efforts, not to physics or mechanics, but to a political career, whether as a civil servant or as
a member of the legal profession or of the judiciary, a political speaker
or a pulpit orator, should not waste too much time, in his adolescence, on
those subjects which are taught by abstract geometry. Let him instead,
cultivate his mind with an ingenious method; let him study topics, and
defend both sides of a controversy, be it on nature, man, or politics, in a
freer and brighter style of expression. Let him not spurn reasons that
wear a semblance of probability and verisimilitude. Let our efforts not be
directed towards achieving superiority over the Ancients merely in the
field of science, while they surpass us in wisdom; let us not be merely
more exact and more true than the Ancients, while allowing them to be
more eloquent than we are; let us equal the Ancients in the fields
of wis6
dom and eloquence as we excel them in the domain of science.
The anniversary of Vico's famous address provides an occasion to recall Vico's lament in the context of contemporary law and legal education.
The essays in this Symposium do not simply engage in a careful exegesis
of Vico's work, nor do they simply provide detailed recommendations for
law and legal education. Rather, the purpose of the Symposium is to revive
Vico's intellectual insights and examine whether they shed light on the
character of law and the objectives of legal education from a theoretical,
epistemological, or practical perspective. The participants have interpreted
this charge broadly and creatively, and the essays that follow represent a
diverse set of perspectives and interests. By recalling Vico's role in questioning the ascendancy of the Cartesian method, the contributions seek to
explore the significance of his important intervention for understanding law
and legal practice.

5. Id. at 33.
6. Id.
at 41.
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Donald Phillip Verene is widely acknowledged to be one of the
world's leading scholars of Vico's thought, and his important contributions
to the field span more than forty years. Verene directs the Vico Institute at
Emory University, which provides scholars with abundant resources concerning Vico's work and its contemporary relevance to a broad variety of
fields. Verene's article provides a necessary touchstone for the Symposium
by reviewing the context for Vico's thought and then advancing an original
argument about the significance of jurisprudence. 7 Verene begins by recalling how Descartes undermined the humanistic ideal of the related virtues of
wisdom, eloquence, and prudence, and he emphasizes that jurisprudence
cannot be developed by the Cartesian method. The humanistic ideal is fostered by an educational approach that acknowledges that wisdom is cultivated through the exercise of memory, imagination, and ingenuity, and that
regards eloquence as an unfolding of wisdom.
Verene then connects prudence to this ideal through jurisprudence, arguing that Vico demonstrates that a "true science of ethics.., can be
formed on the basis of the science of law or jurisprudence. '' 8 In some respects this parallel's Gadamer's argument that legal practice exemplifies
the hermeneutic situation of understanding through application, 9 and
Perelman's contention that legal practice provides a model of moral reasoning, 10 but I believe that Verene is suggesting an even deeper connection.
The cultural reality of law built through the ages is not simply a model of a
certain kind of reasoning, but rather a full embodiment of the substantive
ethical dimension of social life that makes ethical reasoning possible. This
is a radical challenge to the positivist insistence on the separation of law
and morals, and proposes an inversion of the ordinary understanding that
law is a subset of, and derivative of, preexisting morality.
Fellow of the Vico Institute and noted scholar of the work of Vico and
Ernst Cassirer, Thora Ilin Bayer continues to develop the broad themes of

7. Donald Phillip Verene, Vichian Moral Philosophy: Prudence as Jurisprudence,83 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1107 (2008).
8. Id. at 1128.
9. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 324-41 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G.
Marshall trans., Crossroad Publ'g Corp. 2d rev. ed. 1989) (1960) ("The Exemplary Significance of
Legal Hermeneutics").
10.
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REASONING (William Kluback et. al. trans., 1980). Perelman writes provocatively:
If the new concept of law spreads, which is basically a very old one, and which has been forgotten for centuries, philosophers will have much to learn from it. They will look to the techniques of the jurist to learn how to reason about values, how to realize an equilibrium, how to
bring about a synthesis of values.
Id. at 146.
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Vichian philosophy as they relate to law and legal practice.II Bayer notes
that the students hearing Vico's address were primarily law students, and
that his address reveals how much our conception of law has changed over
the past 300 years. Vico understood legal education as the cultivation of
civil wisdom through the development of self-knowledge and an understanding of the historical development of society; he had no concept of law
as a technical and dogmatic exercise. Although Bayer notes that we have
lost the Roman idea of law as a "severe poem," she suggests that Vico's
elaboration of this idea in the face of Cartesian challenges indicates a view
of education that might serve us well today as we struggle to renew legal
professionalism.
In the course of her article, Bayer provides detailed elaborations of
key concepts from Vico's philosophy. First, she identifies how the term
sensus communis (common sense) has been deployed through history, and
notes how Vico unites these different approaches into an encompassing
notion of a historically-developing ground for the exercise of judgment
without need for recourse to Cartesian reflection. Second, she elaborates
Vico's defense of the topoi (topics) that serve as a storehouse of arguments
to be deployed artfully in argumentation. The topics are not just a checklist
of technical arguments; rather, they constitute something more akin to a
roadmap of common sense. Bayer writes:
The orator needs to know not only topics in the sense of the universal
forms of argumentation (that is, definition, partition, and so forth), but
topics in the sense of the memory-places out of which the civil world itself is formed. To speak in the law courts and convince a judge and jury
requires that the speaker has command of a whole education so that he
can take his hearers if needed back to meanings they all share in the back
of their minds and bring his specific arguments12 forward from these
meanings, from the mental dictionary of humanity.
Bayer's analysis demonstrates why relating the humanistic ideals of
education to law is an inspiring, even if daunting, endeavor.
Richard Sherwin is the nation's leading scholar of visual rhetoric in
the digital age and the implications that this development holds for law and
society, and he directs the Visual Persuasion Project at New York Law
School. Sherwin begins his contribution by reminding us that Vico was
woefully out of step with his time, a period in which most thinkers hungered for certainty in the face of unceasing social, religious, and political

11. Thora llin Bayer, Vico's Principle of Sensus Communis and Forensic Eloquence, 83 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1131 (2008).
12. Id. at 1149.
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conflict. 13 He then argues that we find ourselves in a similar period of unrest today due to seemingly unconstrained construction of simulacra, as
powerfully depicted in the movie The Matrix. Descartes appeared to meet
the needs of his age by proposing that rationalism could steer between the
dogmatism of religion and the uncertainties of baroque sensuality, but we
have come to see the severe inadequacies of our Cartesian modernity.
Sherwin argues that a Vichian alternative to Cartesian thinking might be
timely, at long last.
Vico's notion of the sublime and poetic imagination reveals that we
can foster an inventive and dynamic reasonableness that does not purport to
rise above our cultural context: in effect, Vico provides a path between
Plato and Nietzsche as we take up our cultural inheritance and envision
ethics, justice, and law in response to contemporary challenges. Sherwin
contends that the dislocations of our visual age can be developed productively through poetic imagination without pretending to overcome the uncertainties that this reality engenders. Sherwin's essay operates as a caution
as much as an inspiration, given our predisposition to seek certainty as we
did under the banner of Cartesianism. Vico's power lies in his refusal to
grant us easy exit from this angst; he provides a sound pedagogic method
opening the way to a sublime jurisprudence, but offers no guarantees regarding our response to the vicissitudes of political and legal strife.
Willem Witteveen brings a distinctive voice to the Symposium: he is a
law professor with particular expertise in legal rhetoric and the relationship
between law and literature, he has served in the legislature of the Netherlands, and he now is Dean of the faculty of Liberal Arts at Tilburg University. Witteveen begins by noting that Vico worked within a different
worldview from our own, and consequently that we must read him as inventively and metaphorically as he read the ancients.1 4 This inventive reading requires that we navigate between reading him literally and
ahistorically and reading him in a historicist manner. The central premise
of Vico's address that we can develop for our time, Witteveen suggests, is
his ideal of the orator-statesman who reveals the intrinsic connections of
rhetoric, jurisprudence, and politics.
Vico provokes us to overcome the stifling positivism and instrumentalism that define contemporary law and legal education by embracing a
holistic view of practical wisdom that integrates different forms of knowledge. Witteveen suggests a few measures that might achieve this reorienta13.

Richard K. Sherwin, Sublime Jurisprudence:On the Ethical Education of the Legal Imagina-

tion in Our Time, 83 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1157 (2008).

14. Willem J. Witteveen, Reading Vicofor the School of Law, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1197 (2008).
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tion of legal education: the development of a modem set of "topics," the
cultivation of imagination by means of literature and rhetorical exercises,
education in the varied uses of language, and finally a spirit of experimentalism. Witteveen's suggestions remain true to the spirit of Vico's oration
but are attentive to the situation in which law and legal education find
themselves.
Guy Haarscher takes up the central problem of all rhetorical theory:
Can we differentiate appropriate uses of rhetoric from abuses of rhetorical
techniques? 15 Haarscher studied with Chaim Perelman-who revived rhetorical philosophy in the twentieth century by promoting a "new rhetoric"
that returned to Aristotelian themes-and eventually succeeded to Perelman's chair and became the President of the Perelman Center at the Free
University of Brussels. Haarscher champions the renewed attention to
rhetoric in our time as a sign that Vico may finally have triumphed, but he
also interrogates the rhetorical turn by asking how it can respond to the
Cartesian charge that it eliminates the distinction between truth and sophistry. He poses the question dramatically: how can modem citizens avoid
"Trojan horse" rhetoric that undermines liberal democracies by using their
own rhetoric?
Haarscher uses several examples involving censorship and free speech
to explore the rhetorical construction of arguments that amount to a sophistic "translation" of censorship into activities that ostensibly show respect
for human rights. This use of pseudo-arguments should be exposed as such
in order to maintain a well-functioning democracy, Haarscher argues, and it
is precisely rhetorical education that provides the skills necessary for this
demystification. Although most would agree that, in our day, Vico has
"defeated" the ideological fixation with Cartesian thinking that he saw
emerging in the eighteenth century, Haarscher insists that this will be a
hollow victory if we do not tend to the integrity of our rhetorical practices
in order to avoid the misleading guidance offered by sophists. The suppression of rhetoric was harmful to society, but the resuscitation of rhetoric in
the form of sophistry can be equally debilitating. Haarscher does not, nor
can he, provide us with a methodology to draw these distinctions with certainty. He urges us to remember that we must constantly take up this question in our rhetorical exchanges.
In my contribution I link Vico's oration to the contemporary pleas for
reform of American legal education that recently culminated in the Came-

15. Guy Haarscher, Rhetoric and its Abuses: How to Oppose Liberal Democracy While Speaking
its Language, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1225 (2008).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 83:3

gie Report. 16 In my previous scholarship, I have argued that we must combine the insights of hermeneutical and rhetorical philosophy to provide an
adequate account of law. I begin by connecting the critiques of law and
legal education by Anthony Kronman and Karl Llewellyn to the Carnegie
Report, revealing that the core of our contemporary dissatisfaction relates
to more than pedagogical techniques. By asking whether we can teach law
students to become professionals who exhibit prudence and eloquence, the
contemporary critiques return to the age-old debate between Plato and Isocrates.
I argue that Vico's oration was a prescient warning about the emerging Cartesian worldview, and therefore it can serve as a distant mirror in
which we can view our contemporary predicament. Beyond this diagnostic
benefit, Vico also describes the philosophical reorientation necessary to
overcome our lamentable situation. I conclude that Vico articulates an account of rhetorical knowledge that we must embrace if we are to recover
from the disabling effects of our collective Cartesian fantasy. Rhetorical
knowledge is unavoidable and multifaceted, and only by appreciating the
contours of rhetorical knowledge can we reorient law schools to provide
professional education.
Marianne Constable is a professor of rhetoric at Berkeley who has
written about law and legal discourse in an inventive and stimulating manner. Constable provides a Vichian oration for our time, concluding that law
is too important to be left to the lawyers, the philosophers, or the social
scientists. 17 Rhetoricians refuse to be enchanted by philosophical debates
about the nature of law, economic analysis of the patent structure of law,
and empirical descriptions of the law in action. Scholars of rhetoric resolutely insist that we must attend to legal speech-to the claiming and telling that is law-and must acknowledge the ethical and political dimensions
of these speech acts.
Constable suggests that this reorientation would broaden legal education to encompass the "singing" of the poets and the storytelling of the
historians. Positive law would no longer be "the law," to be manipulated
and dissected as lifeless abstractions. This vision runs up against the mod16. Francis J. Mootz III, Vico 's "Ingenious Method" and Legal Education, 83 CHi.-KENT L. REV.
1261 (2008) (discussing WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, LLOYD
BOND & LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007),
which was published as part of The Preparation for the Professions Series of The Carnegie Foundation
for the Advancement of Teaching). Legal educators have adopted the shorthand name "the Carnegie
Report" to refer to this legal education report; all references in the text to "the Carnegie Report" refer to
this 2007 publication.
17. Marianne Constable, On the (Legal) Study Methods of Our Time: Vico Redux, 83 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1303 (2008).
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em bureaucratic organization of the university, the commodification of
education, and the ubiquity of information delivered electronically. Only
rhetoric, Constable argues, can illuminate the path for legal education and
provide the point of access for discussing these developments.
Lief Carter's contribution to the Symposium mimics Vico's ambitious audacity in attempting to chart the course and character of the history
of humanity. 18 Carter, a highly-regarded expert in constitutional law and
legal theory who teaches at an institution devoted to the liberal arts tradition championed by Vico, imaginatively attempts to subvert the liberal
legal order's fascination with individual rights and duties in favor a model
of rule-guided competitive play that joins (political) actors in a shared contest. Carter argues that fundamentalism in politics is a particularly warped
instance of the Cartesian desire for certainty, and it is particularly dangerous in light of our propensity to brutalize the heretics who interfere with
presumed verities.
If we designed political and legal institutions to channel disputes into
play, Carter suggests, we would be better able to contain brutality by fostering something akin to a civic sportsmanship. He reaches this conclusion
by looking at the operation of sports in contemporary culture and drawing
from Vico's insights that the human world is socially constructed and involves human capacities and characteristics that extend well beyond our
rational and calculative abilities. Games help to reconstruct our plastic
brains because participants do not regard opponents as having bad motives
(it is only a game, not personal) and they can accept the legitimacy of losing without retaliation. Carter notes that evolving rules can develop only if
there is an umpire or referee with legitimacy, and this feature of the game
model of politics is certainly the most difficult to implement. However, the
efforts of the legal system to thwart revenge violence through the highly
choreographed contest of a trial provides an intriguing starting point.
In these essays a diverse group of talented scholars bring Vico's oration to life for our time, probing how his wisdom might yet provide guidance as we attempt to come to grips with the powerful urge to rationalize
that is most strongly exhibited in the Cartesian tradition of critical philosophy. A common theme in these articles is the necessity, and difficulty, of
paying heed to Vico's lament in our day. The goal of this Symposium-to
advance down this difficult path-has been realized, but much work remains for us to reimagine our thinking, practices, and pedagogies.

18. Lief H. Carter, Law and Politics as Play, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1333 (2008).

